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SHOULD THE USE OF AUTOMATED LICENSE 
PLATE READERS CONSTITUTE A SEARCH 
AFTER CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES? 
INTRODUCTION 
Are our privacy interests implicated when police keep records of each 
and every time our cars are spotted by automated license plate readers? For 
many years, police have used automated license plate readers (ALPRs) to, 
among other things, “determine whether a vehicle was at the scene of a 
crime, to identify travel patterns, and even to discover vehicles that may be 
associated with each other.”1 These automated license plate readers are 
high-speed cameras that can be either stationary, e.g. mounted on street 
poles, highway overpasses, and the like, or mobile, such as when they are 
mounted on police cars.2 ALPRs automatically capture snapshots of all 
license plates that come within their line of sight, recording simultaneously 
the location, date, and time of the photograph.3 All the data collected—at 
times even including images of cars and passengers—is then uploaded to 
databases that store the information for extended periods of time, sometimes 
as long as five years.4 The data can also be analyzed instantaneously before 
being stored, such as to determine if the vehicle appears on a “hot list.” 
These “hot lists” catalogue a series of license plates associated with stolen 
vehicles or vehicles suspected of involvement in a crime.5 When an 
automated license plate reader scans any license plate appearing on a “hot 
list,” the police are notified. 
At first glance, automated license plate readers may not seem to pose a 
great threat to privacy interests. After all, they only capture license plate 
data in individual snapshots. They mark one moment in time, and that seems 
harmless enough. However, in the aggregate, the pings associated with one 
license plate can paint a detailed picture of that vehicle and its driver’s 
movements. They can even reveal intimate details about an individual’s life 
 
1. Street-Level Surveillance: Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr [https://perma.cc/Q 
7ZH-C575] [hereinafter Street-Level Surveillance]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. Police are not the only collectors of this data, however. Some private companies may 
retain the data indefinitely. Id. These private companies use the data for a variety of purposes, such as 
processing toll fees and repossessing vehicles. Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have 
Helped Police and Lenders Target the Poor, ATLANTIC: TECH. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-have-helped-police-and-lenders-target-the 
-poor/479436/ [https://perma.cc/7GMN-Y48Q]. 
5. Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1. 












as a whole.6 The stored license plate reader data enables police to make 
highly accurate estimations regarding individuals’ homes, places of work, 
favorite hangout spots, etc.7 Police can then infer where an individual will 
go based on where they have been.8 What makes this even more 
troublesome is that drivers must display a license plate, allowing automated 
license plate readers to track the movements of everyone in the vicinity, not 
just those under suspicion of having committed a crime.9  
Police departments and the government have justified the use of 
automated license plate readers by stating that the practice occurs in public 
and is simply a more efficient version of officers recording license plate 
numbers by hand and entering them into a database.10 They rely on the 
 
6. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation,  
Taken in the aggregate, ALPR data can paint an intimate portrait of a driver’s life and even 
chill First Amendment protected activity. ALPR technology can be used to target drivers who 
visit sensitive places such as health centers, immigration clinics, gun shops, union halls, 
protests, or centers of religious worship. 
Id. As one article by the ACLU similarly notes, “[a]utomatic license plate readers (ALPRs) have the 
ability to capture location data that can reveal details about Americans’ religious, sexual, political, 
medical, and associational activities.” Jay Stanley, Virginia Supreme Court Sees Through Police Claim 
that License Plate Data Isn’t ‘Personal’, ACLU (Apr. 26, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
privacy-technology/location-tracking/virginia-supreme-court-sees-through-police-claim-license [https: 
//perma.cc/5XTD-LNHX].  
The idea that automated license plate readers can chill associational activities might seem far-
fetched, but police officers in New York have been caught targeting Muslims with automated license 
plate readers. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Defends Tactics Over Mosque Spying; Records 
Reveal New Details on Muslim Surveillance, HUFFPOST (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.c 
om/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997.html [https://perma.cc/7Y59-8NUS]. One 2012 
article includes accounts by former officials who recalled police driving down the street and recording 
the license plates of all the cars parked in a mosque’s vicinity. Id. 
7. See Cyrus Farivar, We Know Where You’ve Been: Ars Acquires 4.6M License Plate Scans 
from the Cops, ARS TECHNICA 1 (Mar. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03 
/we-know-where-youve-been-ars-acquires-4-6m-license-plate-scans-from-the-cops/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3CJU-9Z3Q] [hereinafter Farivar, 4.6M Scans].  
8. Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1 (“With algorithms applied to the data, the systems 
can reveal regular travel patterns and predict where a driver may be in the future.”). 
9. Id. (“Drivers have no control over whether their vehicle displays a license plate because the 
government requires all car, truck, and motorcycle drivers to display license plates in public view. So 
it’s particularly disturbing that automatic license plate readers are used to track and record the 
movements of millions of ordinary people, even though the overwhelming majority are not connected 
to a crime.”). 
10. See Cyrus Farivar, Your Car, Tracked: The Rapid Rise of License Plate Readers, ARS 
TECHNICA 3 (Sept. 27, 2012, 8:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/your-car-tracked-
the-rapid-rise-of-license-plate-readers/3/ [https://perma.cc/MA3T-MRF5] [hereinafter Farivar, Your 
Car, Tracked] (“In 2006, for instance, Gina L. Bianchi, the deputy commissioner and counsel at the New 
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services wrote in a memo (PDF) to all local law enforcement 
agencies across the state that there ‘does not appear to be any legal impediment to the use of a license 
plate reader by law enforcement. A license plate reader merely accomplishes, more efficiently, the same 
task that a police officer may accomplish by reading a license plate and manually entering the number 
into a database,’ she added. ‘Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a court would not hold that the 













general precedent that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on 
public thoroughfares.11 Nevertheless, while the information collected on 
one occasion is readily available to the public, and a police officer could 
record it by hand, the accumulation of data points over an extended period 
of time for an enormous number of drivers is not something the public or 
the police could easily track.12 Without automated license plate readers, 
police officers would be forced to choose what vehicles to monitor.13 
Automated license plate readers, therefore, eliminate the practical 
limitations on the collection of license plate data that once protected an 
individual’s privacy.14  
Before the development of automated license plate readers and other new 
technologies, “our ability to blend into a crowd [served] as sufficient 
protection” against government invasion of our privacy.15 The whole of our 
movements could not be detected. But now, in most communities, we are 
no longer anonymous individuals in a crowd. Mass data collection methods, 
such as automated license plate readers, eliminate our anonymity, and the 
law must adapt to this changing reality. Given the intimate details that 
automated license plate readers can reveal, we should have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to the aggregated information they 
collect. Carpenter v. United States16 is in line with this assertion. 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court examined whether an individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to cell-site location 
 
automated license plate readers “work[] 100 times better than driving around looking for license plates 
with our eyes.” Dimitar Kostadinov, Privacy Implications of Automatic License Plate Recognition 
Technology, INFOSEC INST. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/privacy-implications-
automatic-license-plate-recognition-technology/#gref [https://perma.cc/LX9X-MLA2].  
11.  Jessica Gutierrez Alm, The Privacies of Life: Automatic License Plate Recognition Is 
Unconstitutional Under the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendmen [sic] Privacy Law, 38 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 127, 129 (2015) (“[I]t is well-accepted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s travels on public roads . . . .”). 
12. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1. Automated license plate reader data is also 
frequently shared. Tanvi Misra, Who’s Tracking Your License Plate?, CITYLAB (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/automated-license-plate-readers-privacy-data-security-police/ 
576904/ [https://perma.cc/JT4L-B2W7]. This means that the information could be viewed thousands of 
miles from where it was collected by police in other locales at all levels of government, including, but 
not limited to, local and state police departments, university campus police, Customs and Border 
Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Id. 
13. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1. 
14. Id.  
15. Jake Laperruque, The Carpenter Decision: A Huge Step Forward for Privacy Rights but 
Major Problems Remain, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (June 28, 2018), https://www.pogo.org/anal 
ysis/2018/06/carpenter-decision-huge-step-forward-for-privacy-rights-but-major-problems-remain/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/6KM7-6ES4]. 
16. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 












information17 cataloguing his movements over a 127-day period.18 The 
Court ultimately held that the government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-
site location information constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment 
and that a search warrant is required to obtain this information.19 In coming 
to this conclusion, the Court read its prior decisions as establishing a right 
to privacy in the whole of an individual’s movements.20 The Court’s 
holding, many commentators believe, calls into question a wide variety of 
mass data collection methods.21 
This Note will analyze whether the use of information collected by 
automated license plate readers should be considered a search under the 
Fourth Amendment in light of the Court’s recent identification of a right to 
privacy in the whole of an individual’s movements. Given that automated 
license plate readers can reveal so many intimate details about our lives, is 
there a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the use of this 
information? Should a query of the aggregated data stored for each license 
plate be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment? Are there 
sufficient parallels between cell-site location information and automated 
license plate reader data so that a conclusion similar to that in Carpenter 
will be reached regarding automated license plate readers? This Note will 
argue that the answer to all of these questions is yes.22  
 
17. While operating, cell phones connect to radio antennas called “cell-sites.” Each time a 
connection is made, a time-stamped record, known as cell-site location information, is created. Id. at 
2211. This cell-site location information can be generated via a user’s intentional actions or 
automatically, like when the phone receives a text, and it enables police to pinpoint the individual’s 
location. Id. The more cell towers in the area, the more accurately the user’s location can be determined. 
Id. Phone companies keep the information for business purposes, but police often acquire the records to 
reconstruct an individual’s movements. Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in 
Carpenter v. United States, LAWFARE INST. (June 22, 2018, 2:05 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/su 
mmary-supreme-court-rules-carpenter-v-united-states [https://perma.cc/6VLU-56YG]. 
18. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.  
19. Id. at 2220–21.  
20. Id. at 2217. The Court also considered the third-party doctrine, which provides that “a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Id. at 
2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)). Despite the importance of the third-
party doctrine with regard to privacy rights, the doctrine is outside the scope of this Note. 
21. See Laperruque, supra note 15 (“Achieving the right to privacy in public spaces is likely to 
have far-reaching implications for emerging surveillance technologies, from facial recognition to 
automated license plate readers to aerial surveillance. All these technologies threaten to permit dragnet 
surveillance of our activities and associations on as significant a scale as cellphone location tracking, 
perhaps even more so. Carpenter lays the foundation for challenging unchecked use of these 
technologies, and makes clear that just because surveillance is of public activities does not mean it can 
go unchecked.”); see also Warren Christopher Freiberg, Carpenter v. US: A Rare Win for Privacy Rights, 
TECHNOSKEPTIC (Aug. 31, 2018), https://thetechnoskeptic.com/carpenter-win-privacy/ [https://perma.c 
c/6W7V-RVB2] (“Carpenter also doesn’t directly address other types of mass data collection such as 
automated license plate readers (ALPR), but it does open the door to challenges.”). 













The Fourth Amendment is meant to protect the public from the overreach 
of police surveillance and arbitrary power.23 The government’s ability to 
view pings from automated license plate data collected over an extended 
period of time, with no detectable check on this power, signifies an 
overreach of police surveillance. Further, there are identifiable parallels 
between the collection of cell-site location information and automated 
license plate reader data, which suggests queries of automated license plate 
reader data should similarly require a search warrant.24 Both types of 
surveillance eliminate the practical limitations police previously faced, 
which protected individuals against invasions of their privacy.25 Moreover, 
automated license plate reader data, while not as constant as cell-site 
location information, allows the police to gain a thorough understanding of 
an individual’s familial, political, professional, religious, and even sexual 
associations.26 Finally, automated license plate reader data, like cell-site 
location information, is retroactive and involves the collection of 
information on all individuals and not just those accused of crimes. This 
means police need not know ahead of time who the target of the 
investigation will be; everyone is surveilled.27  
For these reasons, a database query for information on a particular 
license plate, and therefore the individual driving that vehicle, should be 
considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. However, a search 
warrant should not be required for the collection of automated license plate 
reader location data. Even though the existence of these databases can seem 
troubling, in the interest of not harming law enforcement efforts, police 
should be permitted to collect license plate information without needing a 
search warrant.28 Similarly, there should be an exception to the search 
warrant requirement for checking vehicles against a “hot list,” as this should 
not be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.29 Checking any 
one license plate at a particular moment would not violate the individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is instead the aggregation of license 
plate data and the inferences that can be made from querying license plate 
databases that are particularly troubling and therefore should be regulated.30  
 
23. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra Section II.C. 
25. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text; infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
26. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
27. See supra notes 3, 9 and accompanying text; infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text. 
28. There are certain instances in which automated license plate data could be highly valuable, 
and it is impossible to go back and collect it after the fact. For this reason, this Note advocates allowing 
the collection of the data, but regulating its use. 
29. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
30. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 












Part I of this Note provides additional details regarding the use and 
implications of automated license plate readers and their data. It also 
surveys Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to the landmark 
decision Carpenter v. United States. Part II discusses the consequences of 
Carpenter with regard to automated license plate readers and advocates for 
requiring a search warrant in order to query a database containing automated 
license plate reader data.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Automated License Plate Readers: A More Detailed Look 
As stated in the introduction, automated license plate readers can be 
either stationary or mobile.31 When automated license plate readers are 
mobile, their power is astonishing. The cameras, when mounted on top of 
squad cars, can capture 1,800 license plates per minute, day or night, 
enabling one police car to record more than 14,000 plates in a single shift.32 
Often, cameras mounted on squad cars are purposely left on for the entirety 
of a shift, presumably to capture as much information as possible.33 
Moreover, these cameras can photograph plates even at speeds of sixty-five 
miles per hour.34 Therefore, the sheer amount of data the cameras recover is 
not surprising. One automated license plate reader vendor boasts its 
database contains over five billion license plate detections with over 150 
million more added monthly.35 Similarly, the Maryland data center shows 
that automated license plate readers collected eighty-five million reads 
within the state during 2012 alone.36  
The percentage of these scans that are linked to criminal behavior, 
however, is next to nothing. Studies estimate it to be only around 0.2 
 
31. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
32. Jennifer Lynch & Peter Bibring, Automated License Plate Readers Threaten Our Privacy, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 6, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/alpr [https://per 
ma.cc/XE9L-CXNG].  
33. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1. 
34. Kostadinov, supra note 10. One leading license plate reader company claims that its readers 
can record plates at speeds of 150 miles per hour. Waddell, supra note 4. 
35. PlatesearchTM, VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/license-
plate-recognition-lpr/ [https://perma.cc/77DW-TCDB].  
36. Kostadinov, supra note 10. California police might be using automated license plate readers 
even more aggressively than those in Maryland. Civil litigation revealed the LA Sheriff’s Department 
in conjunction with the LA Police Department has the capability to compile around three million plate 
scans per week. Robert Miller, Eyes on the Road: Automatic License Plate Readers, NAT’L C. FOR DUI 














percent.37 Using the Maryland data as an example, about one in five hundred 
scans were hits, and more significantly, “for every one million plates read 
in Maryland, only [forty-seven] were potentially associated with more 
serious crimes.”38 That so few scans are connected to crimes is particularly 
troubling when considering the amount of information that can be learned 
from the aggregation of license plate data. As previously mentioned, with 
each snapshot, the readers record the date, time, and location at which the 
license plate was spotted.39 Moreover, an entry can even contain images of 
a car’s driver and its passengers.40 When all of the pings for one license 
plate are pieced together, police can determine without serious difficulty 
where an individual lives, works, shops, banks, socializes, etc.41 In essence, 
police can discover how we choose to live our lives. 
To show how invasive the automated license plate reader technology can 
be, Ars Technica obtained the automated license plate reader data collected 
by the Oakland Police Department between December 23, 2010 and May 
31, 2014.42 The dataset for this time period contained 4.6 million reads.43 
After obtaining this information, one Ars Technica reporter sat down with 
an Oakland city council member.44 During the meeting, the company 
accurately determined the block on which the city council member lived 
within a minute of inquiry, much to the member’s surprise.45 
As automated license plate readers become an increasingly popular tool 
in the law enforcement toolkit,46 the information collected will become 
 
37. Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1; see also Kostadinov, supra note 10.  
38. Kostadinov, supra note 10; see also Farivar, Your Car, Tracked, supra note 10, at 2 (“The 
New York State Police 2010 Annual Report found that over 57,000 plates were read by the Auto-Theft 
Unit using its LPRs that year. The result: 200 suspended or revoked registrations . . . and a grand total 
of three stolen vehicles.”). 
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
40. One California man filed a public record request and discovered 100 images of his car 
throughout the city, including a photo of “him and his daughters exiting their car while it was parked in 
their driveway.” Kim Zetter, Even the FBI Had Privacy Concerns on License Plate Readers, WIRED 
(May 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/even-fbi-privacy-concerns-license-plate-re 
aders/ [https://perma.cc/VDK7-CP8H]. 
41. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
42. Farivar, 4.6M Scans, supra note 7, at 1. 
43. Id. Because this time period ended over four years ago, it likely does not accurately 
approximate the number of reads the database would now contain. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. Ars Technica also randomly entered the license plate of a car parked near the bar they 
were “working” out of into their analytical tool and noted the license plate had been scanned almost 50 
times in two clusters: one by the bar and another in a residential neighborhood where the owner 
presumably lived. Id. 
46. A 2012 survey by Police Executive Research Forum found that “71 percent of responding 
agencies use[d the automated license plate reader systems, and] 85 percent . . . plan[ned] on acquiring 
or increasing their use of LPRs over the next five years.” POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL 
ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: “HOW ARE INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING?” 31 
(2012), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/how%20are%20innovations% 












more and more invasive. With additional data pings to analyze, greater 
details can be discerned about individuals’ daily lives. As one California 
state senator aptly noted,  
The thing that I think is not widely understood in the digital age is 
that there’s a difference in degree which ends up being a difference 
in kind. . . . The ability to collect and maintain data in vast numbers 
electronically . . . [is] not just a quantitative difference, it’s a 
qualitative difference.47  
Collecting license plate data by hand and inputting it into a database is 
simply not the same as using automated license plate readers to perform the 
same function.48 Automated license plate readers collect such a large 
amount of data that the difference is a qualitative one.  
As a result, the justification given by police officers and the government 
for their use is not sufficient.49 Additional safeguards are necessary to 
protect our privacy interests. As this Note will argue, a search warrant 
should be required to query a database for information regarding a particular 
license plate.50 That way police are not prevented from collecting this 
valuable information, but we account for its highly sensitive nature.51  
 
20in%20technology%20transforming%20policing%202012.pdf. Similarly, in 2008, Los Angeles Police 
Department Chief Charlie Beck remarked that automated license plate readers “have ‘unlimited 
potential’ as an investigative tool.” Lynch & Bibring, supra note 32. In the police chief’s mind, “the real 
value comes from the long-term investigative uses of being able to track vehicles—where they’ve been 
and what they’ve been doing—and tie that to crimes that have occurred or that will occur.” Id. 
47. Farivar, Your Car, Tracked, supra note 10, at 2. 
48. As one source states, “[b]y this logic, Big Brother’s network of cameras and listening devices 
in 1984 was merely replacing the old analog technologies of eyes and ears in a more efficient manner, 
and was really no different from sending around a team of alert humans.” Conor Friedersdorf, An 
Unprecedented Threat to Privacy, ATLANTIC: POL. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.theatlanti 
c.com/politics/archive/2016/01/vigilant-solutions-surveillance/427047/ [https://perma.cc/7J3C-GTY9]. 
49. Even the FBI was once troubled by the use of automated license plate readers. According to 
one source,  
Internal documents show that the FBI, based on a recommendation from its own lawyers, was 
told to stop buying the devices for a time in 2012. 
[The documents further demonstrate] the FBI’s own Office of General Counsel was grappling 
with concerns about the agency’s use of the technology and the apparent lack of a cohesive 
government policy to protect the civil liberties of citizens whose vehicles are photographed by 
the readers. 
Zetter, supra note 40. 
50. See infra Part II. 
51. This Note’s proposed solution does not eliminate the privacy issues associated with misuse 
of the data, data breach, or inadvertent disclosure. One notable example of data misuse is when a 
Washington, D.C. police officer pled guilty to extortion in 1998 “after looking up the plates of vehicles 
near a gay bar and blackmailing the vehicle owners.” Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 1. While at 
least one police department logs the name of the officer running the query, that department does not 
require the officer to enter a reason for the search. Even if such a reason were required, officers could 













B. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.52 In the Supreme Court’s 
first significant examination of the Fourth Amendment, the Court found that 
it protects “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”53 Further, 
the Amendment is meant to protect the privacies of life against the exertion 
of “arbitrary power.”54  
Generally, the Supreme Court has held surveillance constitutes a search 
when it trespasses on property interests or when government action violates 
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.55 In these instances, a 
search warrant is required to ensure the government is not intruding on the 
privacies of the individual without good reason, or probable cause. The goal 
is to invade an individual’s privacy only when absolutely necessary.  
C. Olmstead v. United States: The Property Rights/Trespass Approach to 
the Fourth Amendment 
The most famous example of the Court’s property rights or trespass 
approach to the Fourth Amendment is Olmstead v. United States.56 In 
Olmstead, federal officers wiretapped the telephone lines of four residences 
and one office without a search warrant, thereby intercepting messages that 
led to the defendants’ arrests.57 In tapping the phone lines, no trespass was 
made upon the defendants’ property.58 According to the Supreme Court, the 
absence of a trespass meant no Fourth Amendment search or seizure 
occurred.59 In order for there to be a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, there needed to be a physical entry of the defendants’ houses 
or offices.60 Here there was no “taking away of something tangible,” but 
only “voluntary conversations secretly overheard.”61 The Court reasoned, 
 
With regard to inadvertent disclosure, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has investigated several 
hundred law-enforcement-operated automated license plate readers which were “leaking data because 
of misconfiguration” and therefore “inadvertently publicly accessible.” Street-Level Surveillance, supra 
note 1. 
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
53. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
54. Id. 
55. JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOLUME 1: 
INVESTIGATION 66–67 (7th ed. 2017); see also infra Sections I.C, I.D, I.E. 
56. DRESSLER, supra note 55, at 67. 
57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928). 
58. Id. at 457. 
59. Id. at 464. 
60. Id.  
61. Id. 












“[t]he Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things—
the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”62 Therefore, the officers’ 
actions did not violate Fourth Amendment protections.63 Resulting case law 
focused on constitutionally-protected areas and not on the individuals 
themselves,64 with the Olmstead property rights/trespass approach 
remaining the Fourth Amendment test for thirty-nine years and 
experiencing a resurgence in recent times.65 
D. Katz and Knotts: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Approach to 
the Fourth Amendment 
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in the landmark decision Katz v. United 
States,66 rejected Olmstead’s property rights or trespass approach to the 
Fourth Amendment67 in favor of a test based on the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.68 In Katz, FBI agents attached a recording device to 
the outside of a telephone booth.69 The government argued, in line with 
precedent, that no search occurred as there was no physical entrance into a 
constitutionally protected area.70 The Court, however, abandoned this test, 
declaring that the Fourth Amendment protected “people, not places.”71 
According to the Court, what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”72 When Katz entered the telephone booth, he meant to exclude 
the “uninvited ear.”73 The proper consideration thereafter became whether 
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy was violated;74 that is, 
where 1) an individual “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and 2) the expectation was one that “society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”75 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 466. 
64. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (“What the Fourth Amendment 
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally 
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion.” (footnote omitted)). 
65. See infra notes 67, 82–88 and accompanying text. 
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
67. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
68. DRESSLER, supra note 55, at 66. 
69. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
70. Id. at 351.  
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 351–52. 
73. Id. at 352. 
74. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
75. Id. The Court sometimes uses different variants of “reasonable,” such as “legitimate” or 













Following this test, the Court held in United States v. Knotts76 that “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements.”77 In Knotts, the police placed a 
beeper inside a container of chloroform and then tracked the chloroform to 
the defendant’s secluded cabin.78 In deciding there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the Court noted that the police could have used 
visual surveillance to attain the same information provided by the beeper.79 
According to the Court, “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the 
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this 
case.”80 However, the Court wisely reserved the question of continuous, 
long-term surveillance when it stated, “if such dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”81 
E. United States v. Jones and the Mosaic Theory  
The Court once again found itself faced with examining the 
constitutionality of surveillance on public thoroughfares absent a warrant in 
United States v. Jones.82 In Jones, the police tracked the defendant’s 
movements for twenty-eight days using a GPS device planted on his car.83 
In determining whether placing such a device on someone’s vehicle and 
using it to monitor their public movements constituted a search,84 the Court 
ultimately returned to its Olmstead property rights reasoning.85 It held that 
the government had physically intruded on private property and thus 
conducted a Fourth Amendment search.86 This holding did not, however, 
 
reasonable, it must be “one that an ordinary person might possess” or, in other words, “an expectation 
of privacy is ‘reasonable’ when a ‘reasonable person’ would not expect his privacy is at serious risk.” 
Id. at 73.  
76. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
77. Id. at 281. 
78. Id. at 277. 
79. Id. at 282.  
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). The Court’s rationale in Knotts is that used by the government 
and police to justify collecting license plate information via automated license plate readers. See Lynch 
& Bibring, supra note 32. The government and the police ignore, however, the Court’s assertion that 
dragnet surveillance might call for different constitutional principles. 
82. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
83. Id. at 403. 
84. Id. at 402. 
85. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
86. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 












reject the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.87 Instead, the Court 
decided that now either test could be used to determine if conduct violated 
the Fourth Amendment.88 
Notably, five justices¾Sotomayor, Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan¾ believed that the Court should have instead analyzed the use of the 
GPS tracking device under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test 
and found that the GPS tracker violated the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.89 The concurring justices drew from the lower 
court’s opinion in United States v. Maynard,90 which argued that the whole 
of Jones’s movements was not exposed to the public actually or 
constructively.91 According to the court in Maynard, “the likelihood anyone 
will observe all those movements is effectively nil,” and “even though each 
individual movement is exposed . . . that whole reveals more—sometimes a 
great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.”92 Prolonged surveillance, 
even in public, the lower court argued, violates an individual’s right to 
privacy because it reveals an intimate picture of the individual’s life.93 As 
the court aptly noted, “[a] person does not leave his privacy behind when he 
walks out his front door.”94 
Common in the reasoning of both the lower court in Maynard and the 
Jones concurrences is a reliance on the mosaic theory of the Fourth 
 
87. See id. at 406–09. According to Justice Scalia,  
[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular 
concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it 
enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding. . . . [T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Therefore, in Jones, the Court determined that Katz had not really rejected the 
Olmstead approach in favor of the Katz approach but rather supplemented it. This conclusion allowed 
the Court to return to its prior jurisprudence without eliminating the reasonable expectation of privacy 
approach. 
88. DRESSLER, supra note 55, at 76. 
89. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
90. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
91. Id. at 558. 
92. Id. The court expanded on these ideas in saying,  
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a single journey as 
he goes to the market or returns home from work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger 
to pick up the scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week out, dogging 
his prey until he has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that make up that 
person’s hitherto private routine. 
Id. at 560. Further, the court noted, “[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed 
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he 
does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual 
trip viewed in isolation.” Id. at 562. 
93. Id. at 562. 













Amendment.95 The mosaic theory asserts that individually meaningless 
pieces of information, when aggregated, combine to create a revealing 
“mosaic,” which is far more intrusive than any one piece of information.96 
When viewed all together, the intimate picture painted by the mosaic 
violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. While the Jones 
concurrences do not officially endorse this view, the arguments made by 
both Justices Sotomayor and Alito support it. 
In her Jones concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued the GPS tracking 
violated the Fourth Amendment because it “reflects a wealth of detail about 
[an individual’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”97 Moreover, the records can be stored and effectively 
“mined” for years, and the inexpensiveness of GPS monitoring compared to 
other surveillance techniques, as well as its secrecy, “evades the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police 
resources and community hostility.’”98 Ultimately, Justice Sotomayor 
seemed skeptical that the average individual would reasonably expect their 
movements to be recorded and aggregated such that the government could 
determine “more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”99 
Justice Alito, in his concurrence, echoed these concerns. He argued that 
in the pre-computer age, individuals were protected by practical limitations 
on police surveillance: “Traditional surveillance for any extended period of 
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The 
surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a 
vehicle for four weeks—would have required a large team of agents, 
multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance.”100 GPS tracking, however, 
eliminated these costs and the protection that they provided. According to 
Justice Alito, individuals did not expect police to secretly track their every 
 
95. Gutierrez Alm, supra note 11, at 142.  
96. DRESSLER, supra note 55, at 103 (“Just as a mosaic is made up of individual meaningless 
points that resolve themselves into a meaningful picture when combined together, the mosaic theory 
holds that aggregating many public pieces of information could result in a ‘mosaic’ that reveals private 
information. Thus, even if a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an individual 
piece of information (such as one trip along a public road), a person could have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in all of his trips along public roads over an extended period. By aggregating all of these 
individual trips, the police are able to spot patterns and potentially deduce intimate information about 
the suspect that they would not be able to deduce after monitoring one trip.”). 
97. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
98. Id. at 416 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).  
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 












movement over an extended period of time, and therefore doing so violated 
the Fourth Amendment.101 
F. Carpenter v. United States: A New Era in Privacy Rights 
Most recently, in Carpenter v. United States,102 the Court decided 
whether the government violated the Fourth Amendment by accessing, 
without a search warrant, historical cell-site location information that 
provided a comprehensive picture of an individual’s movements.103 In 
Carpenter, the police obtained, via court order, cell-site location 
information spanning a period of 127 days.104 In analyzing whether the 
acquisition of this information constituted a search, the Court rejected an 
argument based on Knotts105 that Carpenter had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his public movements.106 More specifically, it noted that the 
Court in Knotts “was careful to distinguish between the rudimentary 
tracking facilitated by the beeper and more sweeping modes of 
surveillance.”107 Ultimately, the Court determined the government had 
conducted a Fourth Amendment search and that a search warrant must be 
obtained in order to acquire cell-site location information.108 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court re-examined the underlying principles behind the 
Fourth Amendment and carefully considered prior precedent in light of 
technological advances.109  
According to the Court, previous cases recognized the main goal of the 
Fourth Amendment as being “to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”110 
Moreover, the Framers intended “to place obstacles in the way of a too 
 
101. Id. at 430. 
102. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
103. Id. at 2211. 
104. Id. at 2212.  
105. See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
106. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. The Court analyzed the constitutional issue using the 
reasonable expectation of privacy framework rather than the trespass/property rights view, as there was 
no physical intrusion. As it stands, the property rights view may rarely be implicated in “the age of ‘big 
data’ where all sorts of information can be learned about an individual without any physical intrusion.” 
Lynn R. Fiorentino et al., The Future of Carpenter: Kavanaugh’s Privacy Views May Help the 
Government, But Hinder Individual Privacy Protections, Including Those Accused of Crimes, ARENT 
FOX (July 25, 2018), https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/future-carpenter-kavanaughs-privac 
y-views-may-help-government-hinder-individual [https://perma.cc/9QZZ-FQLU]. 
107. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
108. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
109. See id. at 2213–18. 














permeating police surveillance.”111 With this in mind, the Supreme Court, 
echoing the Maynard court, declared that individuals do not abandon 
“Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”112 
Instead, the Court reasoned that a majority had already recognized a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of [an individual’s] physical 
movements.”113 That the movements were in public did not change the fact 
that an individual was entitled to protection from “too permeating police 
surveillance.”114 
Some of the key features of cell-site location information particularly 
troubled the Court.115 First, like in Jones, the Court noted the absence of 
practical limitations that had previously prevented the government from 
obtaining such detailed information.116 Second, the Court noted that cell-
site location information amounted to a full accounting of all the 
individual’s whereabouts and therefore provided “an intimate window into 
a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through 
them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.’”117 In the Court’s assessment, the location records revealed 
the “privacies of life.”118 Finally, the Court worried about the retrospective 
nature of the records that not only covered those under suspicion of a crime, 
but everyone.119 The Court distinguished the case from that in Jones where 
the police needed to know who the target was first in order to follow him.120 
With cell-site location information, the government could retrace anyone’s 
steps.121 According to the Court, “[w]hoever the suspect turns out to be, he 
has effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years.”122  
In light of the consequences of cell-site location information, the Court 
declared that its acquisition violates individuals’ reasonable expectation of 
 
111. Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
112. Id. at 2217; see also note 94 and accompanying text. 
113. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (first citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); and then citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)); see supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
114. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595).  
115. See id. at 2216–19. 
116. Id. at 2217 (“Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a 
brief stretch, but doing so ‘for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely 
undertaken.’” (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment))); see also supra 
notes 98, 100 and accompanying text. 
117. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
118. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).  
119. Id. at 2218 (“[T]he retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category of 
information otherwise unknowable. In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were 
limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection.”). 
120. Id.  
121. Id.  
122. Id. 












privacy.123 More significantly, the Court proclaimed that it must consider 
the consequences of any rule in light of all the new sophisticated systems.124 
It is these consequences that must color our understanding of when there 
exists a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
II. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL: WHY QUERYING AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE 
READER DATA SHOULD REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT AFTER CARPENTER 
A. The Implications of Carpenter v. United States 
While the Court once again did not officially endorse the mosaic theory 
of the Fourth Amendment125 in Carpenter, the theory is implicated by the 
Court’s reasoning. The Court in Carpenter recognized that most public 
actions are not protected under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court 
also acknowledged that continued surveillance provides greater details than 
surveillance of any individual moment alone, and, together, these moments 
reveal the privacies of life. Consequently, these moments must be protected. 
It is not enough to say that individuals are protected because some 
inferences must still be drawn from the information in order to glean fully 
the details of an individual’s life; the Court in Carpenter noted its previous 
rejection of the argument that “inference insulates a search.”126 Therefore, 
even if the mosaic theory should not be thought of as a test for whether a 
government action violated the Fourth Amendment, it does hold value as a 
useful thought experiment, one that can help the Court to understand when 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated.127 The 
government has been using the mosaic theory for decades to justify keeping 
information hidden from the public;128 why should the theory not be used to 
protect individuals as well? 
 
123. Id. at 2221. 
124. Id. at 2218. 
125. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)). 
127. This Note does not advocate for the Supreme Court formally adopting the mosaic theory as 
the proper test for establishing violations of the Fourth Amendment. Using the theory as a test as opposed 
to as a useful thought experiment poses a variety of problems. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of 
the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). Kerr acknowledges the concerns leading courts 
to support the mosaic theory but urges them to reject the theory as a “dramatic departure” which would 
require courts to grapple with novel and difficult questions. Id. at 311. According to Kerr, these questions 
include: 1) “What test determines when a mosaic has been created?”, 2) “Which surveillance methods 
prompt a mosaic approach?”, 3) “[H]ow [should courts] analyze the reasonableness of mosaic 
searches[?]”, and 4) “[W]hat remedies should apply to unconstitutional mosaic searches[?]”. See id. at 
329. 
128. See Gutierrez Alm, supra note 11, at 143. The government’s argument in the national security 
context is that otherwise insignificant information when put together can become highly confidential 













The Court’s holding in Carpenter that individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements, and that 
some surveillance techniques are simply too invasive, calls into question a 
variety of surveillance methods.129 While styled as narrow,130 the Court’s 
holding suggests that a difference in degree really is a difference in kind.131 
Further, the fact that these new technologies exist, and the public is 
becoming aware of their existence, does not mean that our privacy rights 
somehow weaken.132 Surveillance does not suddenly become permissible 
because individuals are informed of the fact that the government might be 
watching. The government cannot argue that certain surveillance methods 
do not require a search warrant because the expectation of privacy was 
unreasonable in light of the general awareness of the surveillance. 
B. Search Warrants: A Delicate Balancing Act 
In order to protect our privacy interests, the use of information collected 
by new technologies that can, in the aggregate, reveal an intimate picture of 
an individual’s life should require a search warrant. Requiring a search 
warrant serves as a “bulwark against overreach.”133 As the Supreme Court 
has noted, “the warrant requirement is ‘an important working part of our 
machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow 
“weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.’”134 Rather, search 
warrants and the rule of probable cause together signify “the best 
 
into the hands of, for instance, a hostile intelligence agency. Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic 
Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 845, 846 (2006). By relying on this version of the 
mosaic theory, the government has been able to withhold information in the face of Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. Id. 
129. See Laperruque, supra note 15 (“Traditionally information that the government could freely 
see was by nature not private, and not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. But by saying that 
some surveillance power is simply too powerful to exist unchecked in a democracy, the Court upended 
this idea.”); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
130. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
131. See Laperruque, supra note 15 (“Although some information may be freely visible to observe 
and catalog on an individual scale, we’re entering a new era where for the first time technology may 
allow the government to stockpile such data en masse. Carpenter established that at some point scale of 
collection matters more than availability of information on an individual basis.”). 
132. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (“[T]he Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-
reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure that the 
‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.” (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); see also 
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 524–25 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (“[O]ur 
historical expectations of privacy do not change or somehow weaken simply because we now happen to 
use modern technology to engage in activities in which we have historically maintained protected 
privacy interests.”). 
133. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for 
Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 581 (2017). 
134. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014)). 












compromise that has been found” in the effort to balance both 
“safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with 
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime” and “giv[ing] fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community’s protection.”135 At its core, the search 
warrant requirement is a delicate balancing act, carefully considered and 
designed to both protect individuals’ privacy and the government’s interest 
in security. 
C. The Parallels Between Cell-Site Location Information and Automated 
License Plate Reader Data 
There are sufficient parallels between cell-site location information and 
automated license plate reader data to argue that automated license plate 
readers too should require a search warrant. Like cell-site location 
information, automated license plate readers pose a substantial privacy risk 
when their data is examined in the aggregate. First, both cell-site location 
information and automated license plate readers eliminate the practical 
limitations that police used to face when deciding to conduct surveillance.136 
Automated license plate readers are not simply a more efficient method of 
recording license plate numbers by hand and entering them into a 
database.137 Without them, police officers would be forced to target specific 
individuals in order to see where they went on a daily basis. Further, many 
more personnel would be required, and each officer would have to be paid. 
Thus, automated license plate readers enable the government at 
comparatively low cost to determine where individuals habitually go, and 
the data reveals their patterns, often over the course of several years.  
Second, both cell-site location information and data obtained from 
automated license plate readers can allow police to gain a thorough 
understanding of an individual’s familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.138 These intimate details are revealed when the 
information is considered in the aggregate. By examining everywhere a 
vehicle has been spotted, police can make highly accurate estimations 
regarding an individual’s home, office, grocery store, gym, and so on. 
Knowing that police can obtain this information might chill certain 
behavior, such as participation in political protests.139  
 
135. DRESSLER, supra note 55, at 121 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949)). 
136. See supra notes 13–14, 116 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 10, 47–48 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 6–8, 117 and accompanying text. 
139. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness 













Finally, both cell-site location information and information uncovered 
via automated license plate readers allow officers to retroactively target 
anyone.140 All drivers are required by law to display a license plate,141 and 
automated license plate readers take snapshots of all vehicles that pass in 
their vicinity, not only those vehicles associated with a crime.142 In fact, very 
few vehicles recorded are linked to criminal behavior.143 Police need not 
know ahead of time about whom they wish to collect information. The 
information is simply sitting in a database, waiting for police to ping a 
license plate and see everywhere the vehicle has been.  
While automated license plate data is not as constant as cell-site location 
information, the information gleaned from it is no less troublesome. We 
used to be able to blend into the crowd and trust that the whole of our 
movements could not be detected, but sweeping electronic technologies 
have eliminated this protection in many communities.144 A single query of 
the data collected by automated license plate readers removes our 
anonymity by detailing those places we most like to visit in one fell swoop. 
Consequently, a search warrant should be required for a database query 
regarding information on a particular license plate.  
However, in the interest of not harming law enforcement efforts, a search 
warrant should not be required for the collection of automated license plate 
reader data even though the existence of these databases can seem troubling. 
Similarly, there should be an exception to the search warrant requirement 
for checking vehicles against a “hot list,” as this should not be considered a 
search under the Fourth Amendment;145 checking any one license plate at a 
particular moment would not violate the individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy. It is instead the aggregation of license plate data and the 
inferences that can be made from it that are particularly troubling and 
therefore should be regulated.146  
D. The Need for Constitutional Interpretation Rather than Statutory 
Regulation 
Some commentators argue that statutory regulation rather than 
constitutional interpretation is the best method to protect against the privacy 
 
140. See supra notes 3, 9, 119–122 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 












invasions created by new surveillance methods.147 Constitutional 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, however, is superior to statutory 
regulation. Though some argue that Congress has certain “institutional 
advantages,”148 which might make it appear better suited to address privacy 
issues raised by new technologies, these institutional advantages rarely 
come to fruition. For example, Congress can theoretically act quickly when 
it so chooses,149 but it rarely does. This is especially true when 
disagreements exist along party lines.150  
Further, Congress is fickle; a measure passed by one party may be 
quickly repealed when the opposing party comes to power following an 
election. Privacy interests should not be subject to the ebb and flow of 
political majorities. Similarly, such important protections should not be left 
to the discretion of state legislatures, which are subject to the same political 
pressures as Congress and have thus far been ineffective at enacting the 
necessary safeguards. In 2017, twenty states considered bills related to 
automated license plate readers, but ultimately none were enacted.151  
Finally, lawmakers are not always properly motivated to implement 
automated license plate reader legislation. It has been deemed “politically 
difficult” for legislators to advocate against law enforcement technologies, 
such as automated license plate readers, as the public’s “kneejerk reaction” 
is that the automated license plate readers pose no problems if individuals 
have nothing to hide.152 While public sentiments might be changing in the 
 
147. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 127, at 350. 
148. Id.  
149. Id. 
150. Even when one party controls the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White 
House, that party can be incapable of reaching an agreement. Take for example the situation in our 
country prior to the swearing in of the 116th Congress: Republicans controlled the Executive and 
Legislative branches of our government but were unable to approve a budget, leading to a partial 
government shutdown. Jordain Carney, Lawmakers Punt Shutdown to New Congress, HILL (Dec. 31, 
2018, 10:36 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/423314-lawmakers-punt-shutdown-to-new-con 
gress [https://perma.cc/KA6L-GKST].  
151. Automated License Plate Readers: State Legislation 2016 & 2017, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20180224190105/http://www.ncsl.org/rese 
arch/telecommunications-and-information-technology/automated-license-plate-readers-state-legislatio 
n-2016.aspx [https://perma.cc/5M7J-98D5]. Similarly, in 2016, at least eighteen states considered 
enacting automated license plate reader bills, but only three states¾New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and 
Vermont¾successfully enacted legislation. Id. As of March 15, 2019, only sixteen states had enacted 
statutes regulating the use of automated license plate readers or the retention of automated license plate 
reader data. Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 
15, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-statutes 
-regulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alpr-data.aspx [https://perma.cc/9 4W9-
64WN]. 













age of criminal justice reform,153 there is not yet enough public outcry 
regarding automated license plate readers for legislators to be properly 
motivated to take up the issue. Therefore, it is up to the Supreme Court to 
protect individuals’ privacy interests now.  
E. Why the Fourth Amendment Should Regulate Not Only the Collection 
of Information, but Also Its Use 
Normally, surveillance involves several stages: acquisition, analysis, and 
use or disclosure of information.154 Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment 
has regulated only the acquisition or collection of information and not its 
analysis or use.155 The second two steps have been deemed outside the scope 
of the Amendment.156 However, the use of information, and not just the 
collection of it, should be subject to Fourth Amendment protections and 
require a search warrant.157 First, the privacy concerns associated with the 
government’s broad collection power “might not be so alarming if there 
were reliable limits on how the government used the information in its 
 
153. A George Mason University study found that Virginia residents had complex reactions 
regarding the use of automated license plate readers:  
[M]ost citizens supported their local police using LPR to check to see if passing vehicles were 
stolen or to monitor high-risk targets of terrorism . . . . However, . . . . the majority of 
respondents considered the data collected by LPR systems to be private, and that policies and 
protections should be in place for the use of this data. 
Id. at 2. 
154. Kerr, supra note 127, at 331. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 331–32. 
157. Though extending the Fourth Amendment to regulate the use of information and not just its 
collection is a departure from the Court’s current understanding of the Fourth Amendment, it would 
properly reflect our evolving technology. The Framers of the Constitution could not have imagined the 
volume of personal information that can be stored on individuals’ personal lives and similarly could not 
have understood how the collection of information might not be as invasive as its aggregation and use. 
The Framers’ lack of foresight should not doom individuals to invasions of their privacy because, at the 
time, only the acquisition of items posed a threat.  
What is more, several commenters have similarly argued for Fourth Amendment regulation of the 
use of information. See, e.g., Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 577, 579–80 (2017) (“The privacy impact of large amounts of data, however, does 
not come solely from the sweeping nature of the government’s collection authority. The government’s 
postcollection use of information can¾and often does¾implicate privacy interests just as strongly. . . . 
The Fourth Amendment should regulate information use as well as its collection . . . .”); Russell D. 
Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1302 
(2011) (“If I am right that pervasive surveillance will become the norm, then the problem for 
constitutional criminal procedure must necessarily shift from the regulation of the state’s acquisition of 
information to the regulation of the state’s use and dissemination of that information.”). Covey argues 
that regulating the use of information under the Fourth Amendment is not as radical as some believe, as 
the exclusionary rule “designedly addresses the legitimate and illegitimate uses of evidence and 
information in the state’s possession.” Id.  












possession.”158 Second, modifying the collection rules would either fail to 
address concerns which arise only when the information is used and not 
merely by its collection,159 such as inferences which can be gleaned from 
the information’s aggregation, or substantially hinder law enforcement.  
Further, under the Fourth Amendment, police officers must “particularly 
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”160 This particularity requirement is meant to ensure any search 
conducted is as narrow as possible161 and poses problems when applied to 
the acquisition of license plate information by automatic license plate 
readers. Courts are unlikely to provide search warrants for unfocused, long-
term surveillance where police only anticipate that someone will commit a 
crime at some future time and that the license plate information will prove 
valuable in catching and prosecuting that individual.162 The unfocused 
collection of license plate data does not meet the particularity requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment. A database query would, however. Police could 
specify the exact license plate to be entered, the database to be queried, and 
what they hope to find in the database. 
CONCLUSION 
Automated license plate readers might initially appear not to pose a great 
threat to privacy interests, but upon closer examination, it becomes evident 
that, in the aggregate, the pings associated with one license plate can reveal 
intimate details about an individual’s life as a whole. Practical limitations 
on surveillance once provided individuals with a sense of anonymity. The 
current situation, however, is different; due to new surveillance 
technologies, we are no longer anonymous individuals in a crowd. 
Automated license plate data, when compiled over the span of years, strips 
us of our anonymity and exposes our lives to police scrutiny. A single query 
of the data collected by automated license plate readers has the capacity to 
reveal our familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations 
by revealing those places we most like to visit in one fell swoop. 
In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that 
individuals have a right to privacy in the whole of their movements. Given 
the parallels between cell-site location information, which when acquired 
by the government in Carpenter constituted a search under the Fourth 
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Amendment, and automated license plate reader data, the latter should be 
similarly safeguarded. These safeguards should include requiring a search 
warrant to query a database for information regarding a specific license 
plate. This requirement ensures that police can collect this highly valuable 
information while accounting for its highly sensitive nature. At its core, the 
search warrant requirement is a delicate balancing act, carefully considered 
and designed to protect both individuals’ privacy and the government’s 
interest in security. Requiring a search warrant to query automated license 
plate reader data prevents needless violations of individuals’ privacy and 
permits police to use the new technology to catch criminals. 
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